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Expiration of Swiss Stock Exchange Equivalence and 
Activated Protective Measure
Reference: CapLaw-2019-26
On 30 June 2019, the European Commission did not extend the so-called equivalence 
recognition of the Swiss legal framework applicable to stock exchanges. As a reac-
tion, the Swiss Federal Department of Finance activated countermeasures designed 
to protect Swiss financial market infrastructures, in particular Swiss stock exchanges. 
This article provides an overview of the events surrounding the equivalence of the le-
gal and supervisory framework applicable to stock exchanges and further discusses 
key legal considerations relevant to financial market participants.
By Ramona von Riedmatten
1) The Equivalence Recognition by the European Commission and its 
Significance for Swiss Stock Exchanges
On 3 January 2018, the EU Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (2014/65/
EU) (MiFID II) and the EU Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation ((EU) 
No 600/2014) (MiFIR) were implemented. Article 23 MiFIR introduced a so-called 
share trading obligation, which imposes a trading obligation for shares admitted to 
trading on a regulated market or traded on a trading venue in the European Union 
(EU). Under this obligation, EU investment firms are required to trade such shares 
only on a regulated market, multilateral trading facility (MTF) or systematic internaliser 
in the EU, or on a third-country trading venue considered equivalent in accordance 
with MiFID II. Consequently, EU investment firms may trade shares on Swiss trading 
venues only if the European Commission recognizes the equivalence of the legal and 
supervisory framework applicable to such Swiss trading venues in accordance with 
MiFID II (such equivalence recognition, the “Equivalence”).
Since most Swiss issuers currently have their equity securities traded on one or more 
EU trading venues (either at their request or, more often, based on an unilateral de-
cision of the relevant trading venue and a sponsor firm), the EU share trading obliga-
tion applies to numerous shares issued by Swiss issuers and Equivalence is of impor-
tance for Swiss stock exchanges in order for EU trading participants to be allowed to 
continue accessing the Swiss market locally. Absent such recognition, EU investment 
firms are generally not permitted to place orders (either directly or through brokers) to 
trade shares on the Swiss stock exchanges SIX Swiss Exchange (SIX) and BX Swiss 
(BX). A non-recognition of Equivalence does therefore generally result in the order 
flows from EU investment firms being redirected from SIX and BX to EU trading ven-
ues and significantly reduces the liquidity of Swiss equity markets. Moreover, lacking 
Equivalence, EU investment firms’ options to buy on whichever exchange provides the 

















2) Recent Events in Connection with the Equivalence Recognition
Against the background of the approaching applicability of MiFID II / MiFIR, in De-
cember 2017, the European Commission recognized that the legal and supervisory 
framework applicable to SIX and BX was equivalent to the requirements imposed by 
EU securities laws. However, the European Commission’s decision was limited to a 
period of one year ending on 31 December 2018. The European Commission had in-
dicated at the time that an extension of the applicability of its equivalence decision 
was, inter alia, subject to sufficient progress made towards an agreement establish-
ing a common institutional framework between the EU and Switzerland, thereby pro-
voking criticism about the linking of the technical equivalence decisions with non-re-
lated political matters.
One month prior to the expiration of the Equivalence and failing a positive decision 
from the European Commission with respect to the extension, the Swiss Federal 
Council announced that it had adopted special regulations designed to protect Swiss 
financial market infrastructures on 30 November 2018. More specifically, the Federal 
Council has adopted the Ordinance on the Recognition of Foreign Trading Venues for 
the Trading of Equity Securities of Companies with a Registered Office in Switzerland 
(ORFTV). 
In December 2018, the European Commission confirmed the extension of the Equiv-
alence for another six months until 30 June 2019. Another extension going beyond 
such date has not been granted as of today.
On 24 June 2019, the Federal Department of Finance (FDF) announced that it will 
activate the protective mesure under the ORFTV as of 1 July 2019 in case the Eu-
ropean Commission has not announced by then that it will extend Switzerland’s ex-
change equivalence in due course. Expecting that the European Commission would 
not grant extension in time, on 27 June 2019, the FDF confirmed that the protective 
measure will be activated as of 1 July 2019. 
3) The ORFTV in Detail
The key feature of the ORTFV is the duty of trading venues having their registered of-
fice outside of Switzerland (foreign trading venues) to obtain prior recognition from 
the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) if equity securities of com-
panies having their registered office in Switzerland and listed on a stock exchange 
in Switzerland or traded on a trading venue in Switzerland (Swiss listed equities) are 
traded at such foreign trading venues. This new recognition requirement is comple-
mented by the possibility of temporary authorization for foreign investment firms desir-

















a) Legal Basis and Objectives
The Federal Council introduced the ORFTV based on its competence for foreign rela-
tions under the Swiss Constitution, authorizing the Federal Council to issue ordinances 
and rulings without involving the Swiss Parliament where safeguarding of the interests 
of the country so requires. 
The objective of the ORFTV is that EU investment firms can continue to trade Swiss 
listed equities on Swiss trading venues which is only possible if in doing so, EU invest-
ment firms neither violate the EU share trading obligation nor Swiss law. 
In its communications, the FDF continuously emphasizes that the Federal Council’s pri-
mary objective remains to obtain an unlimited extension of Equivalence. 
b) Duty to Obtain Recognition for Foreign Trading Venues 
According to article 1 ORFTV, trading venues with registered office outside of Swit-
zerland must obtain prior recognition from FINMA if Swiss listed equities are traded at 
such trading venues or if such trading venues facilitate the trading of Swiss listed eq-
uities. 
FINMA shall grant recognition if the foreign trading venue is subject to appropriate 
regulation and supervision and does not have its registered office in a jurisdiction that 
restricts its market participants in trading Swiss listed equities on Swiss trading venues 
and thereby significantly and adversely affects the trading in Swiss listed equities on 
Swiss trading venues (article 2 ORFTV). The FDF publishes a list of such restricting ju-
risdictions. The latest update of this list was published on 27 June 2019 and the only 
jurisdictions included in the list are the member states of the European Union. Conse-
quently, no recognition can be granted to EU trading venues as of 1 July 2019.
Unable to obtain recognition from FINMA, EU foreign trading venues violate ORFTV 
and potentially face criminal liability (see paragraph d) below) if Swiss listed equities 
are traded on them. If EU trading venues want to comply with ORFTV, they must not 
permit the trading of Swiss listed equities (except for certain shares with dual listing). 
Given that the share trading obligation according to article 23 MiFIR only applies with 
respect to shares admitted to trading on an EU regulated market or traded on an EU 
trading venue, article 1 ORFTV generally results in non-applicability of the share trad-
ing obligation with respect to Swiss listed equities. Therefore, since 1 July 2019, EU 
investment firms can trade Swiss listed shares on (non-equivalent) Swiss trading ven-
ues without violating EU law. Further, the share trading obligation does not apply if the 
trading occurs non-systematically, ad hoc, irregularly and infrequently (article 23 (1) (a) 
MiFIR). Thus, even if a certain trading volume with Swiss listed equities remains on EU 
trading venues, EU investment firms can generally trade Swiss listed equities on SIX or 
BX and be in compliance with MiFIR. In summary, ORFTV provides a basis for EU in-
vestment firms to continue trading Swiss listed equities on Swiss trading venues, ab-

















However, the share trading obligation still applies to equity securities issued by Eu-
ropean issuers and such equity securities can no longer be traded by EU investment 
firms on Swiss trading venues despite the protective measure. Against this back-
ground, SIX Swiss Exchange suspended the trading of all listed shares in the “Spon-
sored Foreign Shares” trading segment starting from 1 July 2019 and ceased to of-
fer Swiss EBBO service for on-exchange, hybrid trading of Swiss equity securities, 
which seeks to achieve trades at European best bid and offer prices on a best-effort 
basis (cf. https://www.six-group.com/exchanges/swx_messages/online/swx_mes-
sage_201906281150_en.pdf)
Foreign stock exchanges do not require a recognition with respect to the trading of 
Swiss listed equities that were already admitted to trading or listed on the foreign stock 
exchange prior to 30 November 2018 with the consent of the relevant Swiss issuer, 
i.e., if the relevant Swiss issuer had a secondary listing in the EU at that time (article 1 
(2) ORFTV). 
c) Temporary Authorization of Foreign Participants
Today, foreign participants at Swiss trading venues require an authorization by FINMA 
(cf. article 40 of the Swiss Financial Markets Infrastructure Act (FMIA)) and are sub-
ject to record-keeping and reporting obligations (articles 38 and 39 FMIA). In order 
to quickly enable EU investment firms (who used to trade Swiss listed equities on EU 
trading venues) to participate in Swiss trading venues directly (and not only via a Swiss 
broker) FINMA can, pursuant to article 4 ORFTV, temporarily grant authorization for up 
to one year and such newly authorized foreign participants have to fulfil their record-
keeping and reporting obligations by August 2019 (with trades executed between 
1 January 2019 and 31 July 2019 being recorded and reported retroactively by 
1 October 2019). This possibility accounts for the surge of requests for authorization 
that may result from the restrictions imposed on foreign trading venues.
How many EU investment firms will make use of this temporary authorization is not yet 
clear. In many cases, firms wishing to trade in Swiss listed equities may simply choose 
to go through an existing participant on the SIX or BX, thereby avoiding (even the lim-
ited) administrative expenditure. In case the Equivalence will not be granted for a pro-
longed period of time, it is to be expected that more EU investment firms will likely 
make use of this opportunity.
d) Criminal Sanctions
The ordinance is deemed to be a financial market act (article 5 ORFTV). Therefore, the 
criminal provisions set out in the Swiss Financial Market Supervision Act (FINMASA) 
apply, providing for a prison term of up to three years or a monetary penalty of up to 
CHF 540,000 in case of intentional breach, or a fine of up to CHF 250,000 in case of 
negligence when carrying out without a recognition an activity requiring such recogni-

















4) Conclusion and Outlook
According to market participants neither disruptions nor illiquidity in stock trading were 
observed due to the activation of ORFTV in the first week of July 2019. In fact, trading 
turnover in Swiss shares on SIX during the month July 2019 was considerably higher 
compared to the average trading turnover in Swiss shares during the month July in the 
last ten years.
So far, the ORFTV has proven effective in protecting and safeguarding the function-
ing of Swiss stock exchange infrastructures. However, the long time effects of the 
ORFTV regime will materialize only over time and the full effect of the non-Equivalence 
and Switzerland’s protective measures depends on the duration of the current set-up in 
particular. Further remains to be seen to which extent foreign trading venues will com-
ply with ORFTV and how effectively FINMA will be able to enforce it. 
In the context of the Swiss Equivalence discussions, the question arose, whether a 
withdrawal of equivalence from the UK trading venues could be used as a negotiat-
ing tool in the Brexit debate. Whilst commentators have different views on this, many of 
them doubt that the European Commission would choose the same approach in Brexit 
negotiations, particularly when taking into account that the UK stock market has ap-
proximately twice the size of Switzerland’s market, and further given the fact that UK 
clearing houses are and will continue to be a core part of Europe’s trading infrastruc-
ture. 
The ORFTV is time-limited until year-end 2021 and can also be repealed by the Fed-
eral Council before then. 
While market participants and market commentators currently find themselves some-
what in a “wait and see” situation, I can concur with what the Swiss Federal Coun-
cil and the FDF repeatedly emphasized: an unlimited extension of the stock exchange 
equivalence is the preferred solution and best for all parties involved.

















The Rise of Swiss Domestic Covered Bond Programmes
Reference: CapLaw-2019-27
In the recent past, Swiss domestically oriented covered bond structures have become 
increasingly popular. Under recent successfully established domestic, purely Swiss law 
governed covered bond structures, Swiss issuers have been able to replicate tradi-
tional English law elements of covered bonds under Swiss law, enabling the covered 
bonds to be assigned a triple-A rating. This article discusses the key features.
By Stefan Kramer / David Borer
1) Background
Traditionally, Swiss structured covered bonds have been issued by the UK branch (or 
another non-Swiss branch) of a Swiss bank into the international market. To a consid-
erable extent, such Swiss structured international covered bonds were built on features 
developed in the context of covered bonds structured under English law (including a 
UK trustee concept), but the resulting structure was tailored to reflect specific Swiss 
legal, regulatory, tax and insolvency law aspects.
In the recent past, more Swiss domestically oriented covered bond structures, including 
a listing on the SIX Swiss Exchange, have become increasingly popular. Under recent 
successfully established domestic, purely Swiss law governed covered bond structures, 
Swiss issuers have been able to replicate traditional English law elements of covered 
bonds under Swiss law, enabling the covered bonds to be assigned a triple-A rating.
2) Structural Elements of Covered Bonds
The key elements of recent (international and domestic) Swiss structured covered 
bonds can be summarized as follows:
1. The Swiss bank issues covered bonds as direct, unconditional and unsubordinated 
obligations of the issuer.
2. The obligations of the issuer under the covered bonds benefit from a guarantee is-
sued by a subsidiary of the issuer under a so-called guarantee mandate agreement 
to, or for the benefit of, the covered bondholders.
3. Under the guarantee mandate agreement, all liabilities, costs and expenses incurred 
by the guarantor under or in connection with the guarantee will have to be reim-
bursed (or pre-funded accordingly) by the issuer.
4. As security for the relevant reimbursement and pre-funding claims of the guarantor, 
the Swiss bank acting as issuer transfers a segregated pool of mortgage loans, to-

















Accordingly, if the issuer defaults under the covered bonds and the guarantee is to be 
drawn, the guarantor could claim for coverage by the issuer under the guarantee man-
date agreement. Failure by the issuer to pre-fund the payments drawn under the guar-
antee would allow the guarantor to enforce the segregated cover pool and use the pro-
ceeds to satisfy its payment obligations under the guarantee.
The segregated cover pool assets mainly consist of Swiss mortgage loans granted by 
the issuing bank to Swiss domestic borrowers and the respective mortgage certificates 
securing such loans. Additionally, cash and other qualifying substitute assets may be 
part of the cover pool.
3) Certain Key Features of Swiss Domestic Covered Bonds
a) Applicable law
The traditional Swiss international structured covered bond programmes implemented 
by the two Swiss G-SIBs in the past decade featured a combined English | Swiss law 
structure, combining the requirements of issuing into the international market with the 
particularities of a cover pool consisting of Swiss mortgage assets. 
Under such a combined English | Swiss law structure, the covered bonds as well as 
certain agreements essential for the functioning of the covered bond programme, such 
as the trust deed governing the role of the trustee and the intercreditor deed governing 
the priority of payments in relation to the proceeds of the cover pool, were governed 
by English law. Conversely, the agreements governing the transfer of the mortgage as-
sets and the relationship between the issuer and the guarantor are governed by Swiss 
law. Swiss law governed agreements include, in particular, the security assignment and 
transfer agreement under which the mortgage loans and the related mortgage certifi-
cates are transferred to the guarantor and into the cover pool.
In contrast, under pure Swiss domestic structures, the covered bonds as well as all 
other transaction documents (to the exclusion of any swap agreements) are governed 
by Swiss law. Accordingly, transaction features that are typically inherent to covered 
bond transactions involving an English law governed part (including, in particular, a UK 
trustee structure as well as priority of payments and limited recourse provisions) need 
to be appropriately replicated under Swiss law.
b) Domestic issuer
Domestic covered bonds are typically issued out of the Swiss head office of the is-
suer and listed on the SIX Swiss Exchange. Therefore, contrary to Swiss international 
structured covered bond programmes providing for the issuance out of a non-Swiss 
branch, interest payments on Swiss domestic covered bonds are subject to Swiss with-

















institutional and retail investors, which are generally used to instruments subject to 
Swiss withholding tax. Accordingly, domestically oriented issuance structures for cov-
ered bonds may become even more popular in the future.
c) Segregated cover pool
The cover pool consists of mortgage loans granted to Swiss residents, which are se-
cured by real estate located in Switzerland. For purposes of the covered bonds, the 
claims arising under such mortgage loans are transferred as a security to the guaran-
tor together with the related mortgage certificates. Accordingly, the guarantor will ac-
quire the relevant mortgage claims together with legal title in the mortgage certificates, 
which represent the lien on the residential real estate encumbered. 
In case of insolvency of the issuer, the covered bondholders benefit from the guaran-
tee issued by the guarantor which is backed by the assets in the cover pool, in addi-
tion to their direct recourse to the issuer. While mortgages in the cover pool have been 
transferred to the guarantor for security purposes only and, therefore, have remained 
on the balance sheet of the issuer, in the case the issuer is insolvent, the assets in the 
cover pool would be segregated from the estate of the issuer. Accordingly, as the guar-
antor is the title owner of the cover pool assets it may, subject to any avoidance action, 
manage and enforce such assets independently from any insolvency procedure con-
cerning the issuer. If an enforcement event occurs, the guarantor is entitled to liqui-
date a sufficient part of the cover pool assets by collecting the mortgage claims (if and 
when they fall due) or, subject to certain restrictions, by way of a private sale of mort-
gage assets to an eligible investor.
d) Role of the trustee and bondholders’ representative
Under the traditional Swiss international structured covered bond programmes, an 
English law bond trustee representing the rights and interests of the covered bond-
holders was appointed under an English law trust deed. Under English law, the trustee 
holds the benefit of the rights, powers and covenants in the covered bonds on trust for 
itself (in its own name) on behalf of the covered bondholders. Due to the English law 
trust structure, the covered bondholders are not exposed to the counterparty risk of 
the trustee even if the trustee is holding assets and|or claims in its own name on behalf 
of the covered bondholders. In its capacity as representative of the covered bondhold-
ers, the trustee is also a party to certain essential transaction agreements.
As opposed to English law, Swiss law does not know the concept of a trustee. Ac-
cordingly, in a pure Swiss law covered bond structure, the powers of the trustee need, 
to the extent possible, to be replicated under Swiss law with a view to provide a simi-

















Switzerland, it is not possible to establish a trustee structure similar to the English law 
trust arrangements. 
In particular, Swiss law provides that if covered bonds are publicly offered by a Swiss 
issuer without the involvement of a non-Swiss branch, the bondholders form a com-
munity of bondholders (Gläubigergemeinschaft) by operation of law and the manda-
tory rules on bondholders’ meetings (Gläubigerversammlung) and the representation 
of the bondholders by the bondholders’ representative (Anleihensvertreter) pursuant to 
the Swiss Code of Obligations apply (Swiss Bondholder Provisions)1. The Swiss Bond-
holder Provisions provide for a legal concept that allows the community of bondholders 
to resolve on any matters affecting the interests of the bondholders based on a major-
ity vote. If approved by the applicable majority, the resolution of the bondholders’ meet-
ing will be binding on all bondholders. Moreover, the community of bondholders may 
transfer certain powers to a bondholders’ representative. The bondholders’ representa-
tive has the powers transferred to him by law, by the terms and conditions of the bonds 
(subject to certain limits set by applicable law) or by the bondholders’ meeting. To the 
extent the bondholders’ representative is entitled to exercise certain rights on behalf 
of the covered bondholders, individual bondholders may no longer independently exer-
cise such rights. The main statutory rights of the bondholders’ representative include, 
amongst other things, certain monitoring rights in relation to the issuer, and the right 
to request the issuer to call a bondholders’ meeting. Under a recent purely domestic 
Swiss covered bond programme, the concepts of the bondholders’ representative and 
certain contractual features were combined to equip the “Swiss law trustee” with suf-
ficient powers to provide for a level of protection of the covered bondholders that has 
enabled the covered bonds to be assigend a triple-A rating. For this purpose, the en-
tity acting as “trustee” is appointed to act both as contractual trustee and as bondhold-
ers’ representative in the sense of the Swiss Bondholder Provisions. While both such 
roles are assumed by the same legal entity, the role of the contractual trustee is sep-
arate from the role of the bondholders’ representative: In its role as trustee, the rele-
vant entity is appointed by the issuer and the guarantor under a (Swiss law governed) 
trust agreement to safeguard the rights of the covered bondholders with respect to the 
cover pool. For this purpose, the contractual trustee becomes a party to the certain es-
sential transaction agreements. 
Moreover, in light of the fact that Swiss substantive laws do not know the concept of a 
trust, the bondholders’ representative is authorized in the terms and conditions of the 
covered bonds to hold and enforce the rights under the guarantee as direct representa-
tive (direkter Stellvertreter) in the name and for the account of the covered bondholders. 
1 According to a draft bill proposed by the Swiss Federal Council in March 2019, the Swiss Bondholders Provisions are 
envisaged to be amended with a view to allow, subject to certain conditions, for rights of the bondholders’ meeting and 

















e) Limited recourse and priority of payments
Swiss law does not provide for a specific statutory regime allowing the creation of a 
bankruptcy remote special purpose vehicle such as the guarantor. Therefore, Swiss 
covered bond transactions typically involve a number of contractual features to in-
crease the bankruptcy remoteness of the guarantor. Transaction documents usually 
provide that any rights and claims of transaction parties and investors against the guar-
antor (including under the guarantee) are limited to the amount available to satisfy the 
relevant obligations (so-called limited recourse) and cash collections are distributed 
with contractually agreed priority of payments (so-called waterfall).
Under Swiss substantive law, limited recourse provisions can be replicated as a con-
tractual arrangement under which the relevant transaction parties agree to their claims 
being limited in amount, from time to time, to the funds available to the guarantor to 
satisfy the relevant claim after giving effect to the relevant priority of payments. While 
parties to the transaction documents can validly agree to such limitations of their claims 
based on the concept of freedom of contract, it should be noted that creditors of the 
guarantor that are not a party to the transaction agreements (for example, tax author-
ities and other non-contractual creditors of the guarantor) are not subject to the lim-
ited recourse. Therefore, the corporate documents and transaction agreements are de-
signed to limit, to the extent possible, any unpaid claims by such third parties.
4) Outlook
The recent successful launch of purely domestic covered bond programmes shows that 
it is possible to sufficiently replicate traditional English law key structural elements of 
covered bond transactions under a pure domestic structure. Since structured covered 
bond programmes provide for a diversification of funding sources and have proven to 
be a robust funding tool in times of liquidity constraints in the market, it will be interest-



















Discontinuation of LIBOR and Swiss Law-Governed 
Legacy Bonds – Time to Take a Closer Look
Reference: CapLaw-2019-28
LIBOR was – and still is – the dominant reference rate for CHF-denominated float-
ing rate and other variable interest rate bonds. There is still a significant number of 
outstanding “legacy bonds” with such variable interest rates that have maturities be-
yond the end of 2021, the announced time for the discontinuation of LIBOR. This ar-
ticle discusses considerations for issuers and bondholder representatives in dealing 
with such “legacy bonds”.
By René Bösch / Eduard De Zordi / Benjamin Leisinger / Lee Saladino
1) Background
In his July 2017 speech on The Future of LIBOR, Andrew Bailey of the UK Financial 
Conduct Authority (the FCA), which regulates LIBOR, announced that the FCA intends 
to no longer persuade, or compel, banks to submit to rates for the calculation of LIBOR 
after 2021. Although it is expected that all the current panel banks would agree vol-
untarily to sustain LIBOR for a four to five-year period, i.e., until the end of 2021, the 
speech made it clear that the continuation of LIBOR on the current basis cannot and 
will not be guaranteed after 2021.
About two years have passed since Mr. Bailey’s speech, and various participants in 
the CHF-denominated bond market have invested significant effort in finding a solu-
tion to the expected discontinuation of CHF LIBOR. Some bond issuers began to in-
clude (increasingly) sophisticated fallback and/or replacement rate provisions in the 
terms and conditions of their floating rate (or other variable interest rate) CHF-denom-
inated bonds to specifically address how the interest rate will be determined if CHF LI-
BOR is discontinued. These provisions have been drafted without knowing how and 
when CHF LIBOR will exactly disappear and what will follow, so there can be no cer-
tainty that they will operate as expected if and when the time comes. Notwithstand-
ing this development, there are still a significant number of outstanding CHF-denom-
inated bonds scheduled to mature after 2021 that have interest rates determined by 
reference to CHF LIBOR and have terms and conditions that do not address the ef-
fect of a discontinuation of CHF LIBOR on the determination of the interest rate — be 
it because they contain no fallback provisions at all or no specific fallback or replace-
ment rate provisions addressing such a discontinuation (such bonds being referred to 
herein as “legacy bonds”). For issuers of legacy bonds, as well as for bondholder repre-
sentatives and holders of such legacy bonds, the question arises: what, if anything, they 

















2) Amend the Terms and Conditions?
One possible approach would be to amend the terms and conditions of the legacy 
bonds. If this is done while there is still uncertainty as to the identity and related me-
chanics of the industry-accepted successor rate for CHF LIBOR, such an amendment 
could take the form of a new or additional fallback provision and/or open-ended re-
placement rate provision. In either case, such a provision would provide for the re-
placement of CHF LIBOR with a new rate meeting certain parameters and under cer-
tain conditions. Once there is an industry-accepted successor rate to CHF LIBOR, this 
could also be done by adding a provision providing for the replacement of CHF LIBOR 
with such successor rate.
However, in the case of Swiss issuers of legacy bonds that were public offered, amend-
ing the terms and conditions must not only be done in compliance with the terms and 
conditions of the relevant legacy bonds, but also in compliance with the mandatory 
rules on bondholder meetings in the Swiss Code of Obligations (CO). This article spe-
cifically addresses Swiss issuers and how they may deal with such legacy bonds in 
compliance with the CO.
a) Swiss Issuers – Application of the Bondholder Meeting Provisions  
in the CO
If the relevant legacy bonds were offered directly or indirectly for public subscription 
by a Swiss issuer, i.e., an issuer whose domicile or commercial office is in Switzerland, 
then by operation of law the bondholders will form a community of creditors and the 
mandatory provisions on bondholder meetings of articles 1157 et seq. of the CO apply.
Articles 1157 et seq. CO contain certain high-level provisions on bondholder meetings, 
with the more detailed provisions governing such meetings being set forth in an imple-
menting ordinance issued by the Swiss Federal Council.
b) Quorum and Majority Requirements
With respect to amendments of the terms and conditions of Swiss law-governed bonds, 
one has to distinguish between types of amendments that are already specifically pro-
vided for in the terms and conditions themselves (and that are, therefore, covered by 
the parties’ agreement) and other types of amendments. In the case of an amendment 
foreseen in the terms and conditions, the applicable provision of the terms and condi-
tions will normally also govern how such amendment may be effected. With respect to 
any other amendment of the terms and conditions, the mandatory Swiss provisions on 
bondholder meetings will apply. However, not all amendments are treated identically 
under such provisions. Rather, these provisions differentiate between amendments that 
are, for bondholders, clearly positive, neutral to positive, negative and specifically set 

















In the context of amending the terms and conditions of legacy bonds in a way that will 
or may result in the replacement of CHF LIBOR (or the relevant reference rate based 
on CHF LIBOR) as the reference rate, three provisions of Swiss law are of particular 
importance:
– Article 1170 CO, which, subject to stricter requirements in the terms and conditions, 
if any, requires a majority of at least two-thirds of the outstanding aggregate princi-
pal amount of the relevant series of bonds to pass a valid resolution approving cer-
tain enumerated measures. This exhaustive list includes measures that decrease 
the interest rate by up to one-half of the rate set by the terms and conditions of the 
bonds for a period of up to ten years, with the option to extend such period for up to 
an additional five years. 
– Article 1173 CO, which applies to resolutions approving measures not set forth in 
article 1170 CO, but that still negatively modify the rights of bondholders, and re-
quires unanimous consent. Except for privately placed bonds, this standard of unan-
imous consent is impossible to achieve in practice.
– Article 1181 CO, which applies to resolutions approving measures that do not limit 
the rights of the bondholders, and, subject to stricter requirements in the terms and 
conditions, if any, merely requires more than half of the outstanding aggregate prin-
cipal amount of the bonds actually represented at the bondholders’ meeting, unless 
the law stipulates otherwise (cf. article 1170 CO, or the revocation or modification 
of the authority conferred on a bondholder representative governed by article 1180 
CO).
If the issuer’s rights are negatively modified by any amendment to the terms and condi-
tions of the bonds, such amendment will require the consent of the issuer as well. 
Applying the above to legacy bonds, if the use of the industry-accepted successor 
rate to CHF LIBOR in place of CHF LIBOR would be, or if the terms of the fallback 
or open-ended replacement rate provision are, economically positive to the bondhold-
ers, the issuer could take the view that the bondholders will not object to getting more 
than they bargained for and, consequently, that no bondholders’ consent for amending 
the terms and conditions to provide for such use or provision is required. Arguably, for 
Swiss law-governed legacy bonds, the issuer may also rely, by analogy to article 6 CO, 
on the presumption of consent by all bondholders, so long as such successor rate or 
fallback or replacement rate provision, as applicable, is clearly beneficial to the bond-
holders for the remaining term of such legacy bonds. Therefore, the economic effect 
that replacing CHF LIBOR with the industry-accepted successor rate or that a new or 
additional fallback or open-ended replacement rate provision, as the case may be, will 
have on bondholders is of the upmost importance when determining whether such re-

















view, such effect would need to be assessed only one time, i.e., prior to first introducing 
the successor rate or fallback or replacement rate provision and amending the terms 
and conditions. The economic effect does not need to be measured on an ongoing ba-
sis or at any particular time thereafter (e.g., when the interest rate resets or when the 
fallback or open-ended replacement rate provision is actually triggered). 
The analysis described above may be illustrated by reference to an extreme example: 
if using a new reference rate in place of CHF LIBOR would effectively reduce the in-
terest rate by up to one-half of the rate envisaged in the terms and conditions of the 
bonds, article 1170 CO would require at least a two-thirds majority consent to do so. If 
the reduction were more than that, only a unanimous consent could achieve this. It is, 
however, very unlikely that the bondholders would agree to such an amendment, the 
terms of which are to their disadvantage.
The crucial question is, therefore, how to achieve a result that is as economically neu-
tral as possible; meaning to ensure the continuation of the economic bargain with re-
spect to the interest rate that would have been in place had CHF LIBOR not been 
discontinued (and replaced). And how do issuers know whether there is such an eco-
nomically neutral switch and what to do then? This question calls for an interpretation 
of the terms and conditions.
3) Interpretation of Terms and Conditions of Swiss Law-Governed Bonds
a) Principles of Interpretation
In Swiss law, when interpreting the terms and conditions of a bond, the primary focus is 
on an objective interpretation thereof based on the principle of trust. According to the 
Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in light of the principle of trust, it is relevant “what rea-
sonable and correctly acting parties would have wanted to agree among themselves 
in the circumstances at the time the contract was concluded” and “how a condition or 
statement could, and had to be, understood in good faith by the recipient”, whereby “al-
ways the context, in which the expression of will was made has to be taken into con-
sideration”. 
In the case of the terms and conditions of a bond, doctrine demands that the terms 
and conditions be interpreted uniformly, rather than based on the relevant individual’s 
good faith interpretation. Thus, it is not a question of what the individual buyer of the 
bond understood at the time of purchase. Rather, the decisive factor is how an average 
professional investor would understand the terms and conditions based on the princi-
ple of trust. Some scholars have expressly stated that an interpretation in conformity 
with the capital market should take precedence over interpretations based on princi-
ples of investor protection. However, even with an interpretation in conformity with the 
capital market, the primary means, and starting point, of interpretation is still the actual 

















decisive. Using methods analogous to the rules applied in connection with general 
terms and conditions (which terms and conditions are not in Swiss law), doctrine re-
quires any unclear terms to be interpreted against the issuer.
Accordingly, when interpreting the interest provision in Swiss law-governed terms and 
conditions, the question should be “what would the hypothetical average professional 
investor and the issuer have agreed” and does the wording itself provide any indication 
as what the parties agreed (e.g., even if there is no explicit fallback provision, does the 
provision speak of a possible successor rate, screen page or administrator)?
b) Application to Interest Provisions tied to CHF LIBOR in Legacy Bonds
In our view, when analyzing the Swiss law-governed terms and conditions of any legacy 
bonds, the hypothetical will of the parties – which would also be relevant in the case of 
a clausula rebus sic stantibus and an amendment of a contract by a Swiss court due 
to unforeseeable change in circumstances – cannot have been to have a dysfunctional 
interest rate provision. Furthermore, we believe that a dysfunctional interest rate provi-
sion should not result in an extraordinary termination right either because of the gen-
eral principle of pacta sunt servanda and the economic expectations of the parties at 
the time of issuance of the legacy bonds. 
In the case of Swiss law-governed terms and conditions of legacy bonds that pro-
vide for the calculation of interest on the basis of CHF LIBOR without the benefit of 
any fallback provision whatsoever, the agreement to issue and purchase such legacy 
bonds may well be interpreted as (i) an agreement to use the industry-accepted and 
prevailing reference rate for CHF-denominated floating rate bonds generally and (ii) 
an agreement to be treated economically the same way as if CHF LIBOR had been 
continued. In other words, an agreement to replace CHF LIBOR (or the reference rate 
based on CHF LIBOR) with the successor industry-accepted and prevailing reference 
rate for CHF-denominated floating rate bonds and implement whatever adjustments 
to such rate as are necessary in order to reduce or eliminate, to the extent reasonably 
practicable under the circumstances, any economic prejudice or benefit, as applicable, 
to holders as a result of such replacement of CHF LIBOR.
c) But the Terms and Conditions Prevail…
Notwithstanding the above, if the terms and conditions of the legacy bonds already 
contain a fallback provision that would provide a way to calculate the interest rate if 
CHF LIBOR were to be discontinued, we see little room for proceeding as laid out in 
the previous subsection b). This, unfortunately, holds true even if the interest rate re-
sulting from such fallback provision turns out not to be beneficial for the holders or the 
issuer – e.g., if the ultimate fallback in the conditions is the continuation of the last in-
terest rate on a fixed-rate basis and the interest rates significantly rise (negative to the 

















on a specific fallback regime that may only be amended with bondholders’ consent 
(subject to obtaining requisite defined majority required under the CO to pass such 
amendment). The introduction of a fallback provision that takes into account the princi-
ples set out in subsection b) above should, however, be neutral to the bondholders and, 
therefore, could be approved by the defined majority required under article 1181 CO, 
subject to stricter requirements in the terms and conditions, if any.
d) Just Pay the New Interest Rate?
Even if the discontinuation of CHF LIBOR can be addressed by merely interpreting the 
terms and conditions of the respective legacy bonds (i.e., rather than by amendment), 
the new reference rate or mechanism for calculating the interest rate will still have to 
be communicated to the bondholders. Accordingly, the issuer must publish a notice in 
line with the terms and conditions and – for bonds listed on the SIX Swiss Exchange – 
publish an official notice in line with the Directive Regular Reporting Obligations of the 
SIX Swiss Exchange.
4) Importance of the Economic Effect
Whichever approach is chosen, the analysis as to what is permissible and how it should 
be effected depends largely on the assessment of the economic effect the new inter-
est rate or interest rate mechanism will have on bondholders. 
To complete this assessment, as well as to evaluate the risks associated with a particu-
lar approach, the relevant terms and conditions should be analyzed as to whether the 
approach chosen may potentially constitute an event of default thereunder and, in such 
case, who would be authorized to accelerate the bonds. In the case of Swiss law gov-
erned terms and conditions, typically only the bondholders’ representative can acceler-
ate the bonds. For this reason, it is advisable that each issuer coordinates its approach 
with the applicable bondholders’ representative(s).
5) Time to Act
As the end of 2021 comes closer, it is clear that companies should now take a close 
look at the terms of any legacy bonds issued or guaranteed by them, particularly at 
their maturity dates and the interest rate provisions contained therein.
In this context, it is advisable to also review related hedging arrangements and to ana-
lyze the consequences an amendment (or adjusted interpretation) of the terms of con-
ditions of the respective legacy bonds may have on such arrangements.
René Bösch (rene.boesch@homburger.ch)




















Swiss Withholding Tax – Quo Vadis?
Reference: CapLaw-2019-29
On 26 June 2019, the Federal Council approved the objectives and key figures for a 
withholding tax reform. The Federal Council wants to strengthen the Swiss debt cap-
ital market and to extend the safeguard purpose for Swiss individuals. Interest pay-
ments to Swiss entities and foreign investors shall be exempt from withholding tax. 
For Swiss resident individuals, withholding tax shall also be applied on interest from 
foreign investments if held through a Swiss paying agent. The consultation draft is ex-
pected in autumn 2019.
By Alexandra Hirt 
1) Current Swiss Withholding Tax System
At present, withholding tax is levied on interest, participation income, lottery winnings 
and certain insurance benefits. The legal basis is the Withholding Tax Code of 13 Oc-
tober 1965. The applicable tax rate is 35%. The tax is levied independently of the per-
son of the investor. It affects both individual and institutional investors, as well as for-
eign investors.
A differentiation is made at the refund level. Swiss-resident investors can normally ob-
tain a full refund of the withholding tax if they declare to the authorities responsible 
their income subject to withholding tax. In Switzerland, the withholding tax thus has 
a safeguard purpose. Foreign investors are entitled to a full or partial refund of with-
holding tax, depending on the applicable double taxation agreement between Switzer-
land and their country of residence. With regard to foreign investors, the tax is partly in-
tended for fiscal purposes.
The withholding tax on domestic bonds is a disadvantage of the Swiss capital mar-
ket. Foreign investors might reclaim the withholding tax, but the procedure is cumber-
some and, depending on the recipient state, the reclaimability is limited. Swiss bonds 
are therefore unattractive for foreign investors. Withholding tax often prevents Swiss 
groups from raising capital in Switzerland. They prefer to issue bonds through a foreign 
subsidiary. 
There are various other reasons for reforming the current system. Gaps in the safe-
guard purpose for Swiss resident individuals shall be reduced. Further, the international 
automatic exchange of information helps to ensure taxation in the country of residence 
of the respective investor and is, therefore, an additional safeguard measure to ensure 


















2) Developments to Date 
The reform of the withholding tax has been in political discussion for about 10 years. 
The Federal Council had launched a first reform of the withholding tax in 2010 in order 
to strengthen the Swiss debt capital market. The Federal Council wanted to replace 
the existing debtor-based regime by a paying agent-based regime. Parliament, how-
ever, rejected this proposal in 2012. 
At the end of 2014, the Federal Council launched the consultation on a new proposal. 
Again, the Federal Council suggested a system change from the debtor principle to the 
paying agent principle. Due to the negative feedback in the consultation process from 
Swiss official and private bodies, the Federal Council decided in June 2015 to post-
pone the reform until further notice. 
On 26 June 2019, the Federal Council decided to reactivate the suspended reform of 
the withholding tax. The Federal Council approved the objectives and key figures for 
the withholding tax reform. The Federal Finance Department shall prepare a consulta-
tion draft by autumn 2019.
3) Strategic Directions for the Consultation Draft 2019 
The Federal Council formulated the following objectives for the preparation of the con-
sultation draft, combined with a total of eight parameters for the implementation:
a) Strengthening Switzerland’s Debt Capital Market
One core element of the reform proposal is the exemption of Swiss legal entities and 
foreign investors from withholding tax on interest investments (Parameter 1). The Fed-
eral Council expects this to significantly strengthen the Swiss bond market. Swiss 
groups shall be able to issue their bonds at competitive rates.
b) Extension of the Safeguard Purpose of Withholding Tax in Switzerland
The second core element of the reform is the extension of the safeguard purpose for 
Swiss resident individuals in order to combat tax evasion. Swiss resident individuals 
shall in the future also be affected by a withholding tax on foreign interest payments if 
such investments are held through a Swiss paying agent; net income from foreign eq-
uities remain out of scope (Parameter 2). 
c) Ensuring Legal Certainty and Stability of the Financial Centre
A transitional regulation shall be provided for existing too-big-to-fail instruments (Co-
Cos, bail-in and write-off-bonds) (Parameter 3). These instruments are currently ex-


















Further, a legal basis shall be established for structured products. It should be stipu-
lated in the law that payments which are used to replicate or pass on bond interest, div-
idends or the like are subject to withholding tax (Parameter 4).
d) Consideration of Additional Costs and Liability Risks
The banks are facing new responsibilities due to the planned reform. The Federal 
Council is aware that this will increase their liability risk and that implementation will 
lead to costs. Paying agents shall receive an adequate compensation, possibly for a 
limited period (Parameter 5). The withholding tax is to be levied on an ongoing ba-
sis (Parameter 6). Criminal liability shall be limited to intent (Parameter 7). In addition, 
it shall still be possible to outsource the processing of the withholding tax in order to 
simplify administration; this shall not lead to a transfer of liability (Parameter 8).
e) Further Considerations of the Federal Council
With regard to the financial consequences of the reform proposal, the Federal Coun-
cil assumes an estimated loss of CHF 200 million per year. At the same time, it ex-
pects dynamic additional revenues from the strengthening of the capital market. The 
strengthening of the safeguard purpose of the withholding tax shall also lead to more 
tax revenue. The Federal Council therefore assesses the cost-benefit ratio of this re-
form to be beneficial.
In its decision, the Federal Council considered two studies, which had been commis-
sioned by the Federal Department of Finance. KPMG had analysed the financial ef-
fects of a reform of withholding tax and BaK Economics the economic effects of a re-
form of stamp duties and withholding tax. 
The Federal Council refused pursuing a more comprehensive reform for cost rea-
sons. Such a reform would have included the complete abolition of the transfer stamp 
tax and/or a reduction of the withholding tax rate on dividends. However, the Federal 
Council does not rule out the possibility that the reform may be supplemented by ad-
ditional measures. The Department of Finance will examine this as part of the prepa-
rations for the consultation process (in particular profit tax in the area of participation 
deduction, abolition of transfer stamp tax on Swiss debt securities, equal treatment for 
indirect and direct interest investments). 
4) Appraisal
The Federal Council’s decision of 26 June 2019 is a concept paper with few details. 
The new proposal will be concretized for the planned consultation. The project seems 
positive, with good chances of implementation. It is less complex than previous con-
cepts. In doing so, the Federal Council takes the negative feedback in the consulta-


















administrative burden and liability risks from the replacement of the existing debtor-
based regime by a paying agent-based regime.
No change is expected for Swiss companies’ dividends, as there is no need for action 
in that respect from a capital market view or in terms of safeguarding tax receipts. In 
particular, the tax rate will probably remain at 35% for both interest and dividends. 
From a Swiss capital market perspective, the proposed changes are highly welcome. It 
can be assumed that the planned reform of the withholding tax will have a positive ef-
fect on the development of the Swiss capital market.
Alexandra Hirt (alexandra.hirt@lenzstaehelin.com)
Board Composition and Ownership Structure  
in Switzerland – The Empirical Evidence
Reference: CapLaw-2019-30
The theory and practice of corporate governance and capital markets suggest that 
certain organizational structures of listed companies are to be considered superior to 
others or even best practice. This article critically reviews the mainstream doctrine and 
reports on the results of my own empirical research on corporate governance of pub-
licly-traded companies with access to capital markets in Switzerland.
By Valentin Jentsch
1) Introduction
Various corporate law and governance theories inform us that board independence, 
management ownership and blockholder ownership are important elements of the 
overall corporate governance system. It has been close to conventional wisdom among 
scholars and practitioners that both independent directors and separated CEO and 
chairman roles are to be considered “good” corporate governance. It is also often ar-
gued that non-executive directors as well as executive directors and officers are more 
effective monitors and more focused on maximizing shareholder value when they have 
a larger financial stake in the company. Standard theory further predicts that controlling 
shareholders and institutional investors are efficient monitors because they manage to 
overcome collective action problems and make better investment decisions, also be-
cause they more closely monitor the companies they invest in. The empirical evidence 
on the effectiveness of these elements is, however, mixed at best. Moreover, the results 
and conclusions of prior theoretical and empirical research are typically country-spe-


















In a recent article, titled Board Composition, Ownership Structure and Firm Value: Em-
pirical Evidence from Switzerland, which has just been published in issue 2 of volume 
20 of the European Business Organization Law Review (June 2019), I analyze a panel 
data set consisting of 43 large listed companies over a time frame of 6 years in the 
context of the small and open economy of Switzerland. The results of this analysis sug-
gest that a larger fraction of independent directors on the company board decreases 
firm value and that a combined leadership structure may also increase value. In addi-
tion, the results indicate that both the presence of current or former executive directors 
on the board and a chairman with executive functions or a CEO who sits on the board 
may increase firm value. Similarly, the results suggest that the presence of a control-
ling shareholder decreases firm value and that the presence of institutional investors 
as significant shareholders may also decrease value.
Based on these results, I hypothesize that modern corporate governance theory and 
public policy rule-making in this area should in particular focus on four patterns. First, 
a majority rule of independent directors seems to be sufficient and more efficient than 
a supermajority rule, the independence definition should include the representation of 
significant shareholders and soft law should provide for a certain minimum number or 
percentage of executive directors. Second, the CEO and chairman function should not 
by rule of law or recommendation be required to be separated and there should be 
enough room for top executives to engage with and ultimately join the company board. 
Third, the minority rights should be further strengthened, a majority of the minority vote 
should be introduced for certain key situations in which the entrenchment risk of the 
controlling shareholder is evident and whether controlling shareholders should be sub-
ject to a duty of loyalty towards the company and/or public shareholders has to be se-
riously considered. Fourth, the exercise of the participation and voting rights of such 
investors should be further enabled and facilitated as well as a legal basis for the issu-
ance of loyalty shares to long-term investors should be created.
In this contribution, I will briefly summarize and highlight the main arguments made in 
my article mentioned above. I will do so by briefly outlining these four patterns on the 
role of independent directors, CEO and chairman, controlling shareholders and institu-
tional investors in listed companies, with a particular focus on the corporate landscape 
in Switzerland, but also beyond.
2) Board Composition
a) Independent Directors
Several regression models of my study show a very high statistically significant nega-
tive correlation between the number of independent directors sitting on the board and 
firm value. These results, however, do not mean that independent directors are not im-


















examination were considered to be independent at all times, these results must be in-
terpreted on the examined 0.5 to 1 scale so that, once the majority threshold is met, 
additional independent directors do not add, but diminish value. The corresponding pol-
icy implication of that finding is that a majority rule, requiring at least 50% independent 
directors on Swiss boards, should be more efficient than a supermajority rule, which, 
for example, requires a minimum of 66% or 75% of independent board members.
Moreover, how director independence is defined in the Swiss context is of crucial im-
portance. One dimension that should definitely be considered to be included as an in-
dependence criterion in Switzerland is the relationship to a significant shareholder. In 
my view, directors who represent a significant shareholder can by definition not be 
qualified as independent since they are serving such a (controlling) shareholder, but 
not the company and/or the public shareholders, which would in fact be part of their 
role.
Other models of my study show a somewhat high statistically significant positive cor-
relation between the presence of current executive directors and firm value, indicating 
that an executive has more accurate and timely information about the current state of 
the company, which can be of great importance to the board. In addition, these mod-
els suggest that former executive directors positively affect firm value, indicating that 
board members, who have recently served in an executive role, know the company and 
the industry better and are therefore in a position to create additional value for share-
holders. Therefore, a potential policy implication would be to require that the board of a 
listed company includes at least one director, who currently or recently held an execu-
tive function in the company.
b) CEO and Chairman
Arguably the most meaningful regression model of my study suggests that there is 
some evidence that a combined CEO and chairman role may increase stock market 
performance. A possible interpretation of this finding is that the market actually under-
values such a combined leadership structure, which might potentially add value. It can 
further serve as a basis to argue that public policy should not prevent listed companies 
from appointing the same person as CEO and chairman.
This finding is further confirmed by other models of my study, according to which there 
is some evidence that a CEO sitting on the board and a chairman with executive func-
tions might add value. These results thus suggest that a combined or overlapping lead-
ership structure can be superior to strictly separated functions. This implies that public 
policy should not prohibit such organizational structures and calls for a policy building 




















Almost all regression models of my study show a very high statistically significant neg-
ative correlation between the presence of a controlling shareholder and firm value. 
Given these unambiguous results, it is quite straightforward to conclude that control-
ling shareholders are not good monitors and in fact decrease firm value. According to 
the literature, this is arguably because such shareholders are not in a position to effec-
tively police management, but because they are more likely to use their power in order 
to extract private benefits from the company. This discussion has been reframed as the 
controlling shareholder tradeoff. Referring to this framework highlights that the share-
holder rights of the majority and the minority cannot be considered adequate and well 
balanced in Switzerland and calls for a public policy focusing on the protection of mi-
nority shareholders.
One approach would be to strengthen certain minority rights in Swiss corporate law. 
This has, to a certain extent, already been proposed in the course of the ongoing revi-
sion of Swiss corporate law. These policy proposals thus have to be assessed favorably.
Another measure of minority protection, which has been suggested more recently, is 
the introduction of a majority of the minority vote as a default rule for all companies 
listed in Switzerland. My take on this controversially discussed issue would be that the 
majority of the minority vote does in fact have a legitimate scope of application, namely 
when the minority rights are endangered. Typical examples for such a situation would 
include the introduction of an opting-out clause in relation to the obligation to submit 
a public tender offer or the ex post introduction of a share transfer restriction regime.
Another possible alternative for providing a more balanced protection of minorities 
would be to impose a duty of loyalty on the controlling shareholder (vis-à-vis the com-
pany and/or the other shareholders). In this framework, it would further be conceiva-
ble that a controlling shareholder could be held responsible and liable for the damage it 
causes to the company and/or other shareholders.
b) Institutional Investors
A few regression models of my study, arguably the most meaningful models, suggest 
that there is some evidence that the presence of institutional investors may decrease 
stock market performance, leading to the conclusion that institutional investors are not 
good corporate governance monitors. One explanation might be that the market actu-
ally overvalues an ownership structure with a large part of institutional investors as mi-
norities, which indicates that such company should eventually be traded at a discount. 
This discussion can however be reframed as the institutional investor tradeoff. Using 


















too passive and often seem to be focused on short-term results, which calls for a pub-
lic policy that promotes active involvement and engagement of all sorts of institutional 
investors in the company and encourages a long-term investment horizon among all 
types of institutional investors.
One way to promote an active involvement and engagement of all sorts of institutional 
investors in the company would be to enable and facilitate the exercise of their par-
ticipation and voting rights. Many of the policies, which have been introduced more re-
cently, thus have to be assessed favorably.
An instrument that encourages a long-term orientation of institutional investors would 
be the issuance of loyalty shares (i.e., shares with multiple voting or dividend rights) to 
long-term shareholders. It is up to the Swiss legislator to consider, whether or not to in-
troduce this instrument into the law.
4) Conclusion
The new evidence of my country study casts doubt on several generally accepted good 
corporate governance principles and highlights the need for a reconsideration of public 
policy towards board governance and blockholder governance, not only in Switzerland, 
but also at the international level. The findings and conclusions of my article essentially 
cast doubt on and point to the need for fundamental revision of generally accepted in-
ternational understandings of what constitutes “good” corporate governance norms to-
day, in particular with regard to listed companies with access to capital markets. This is 
especially true for the concept of independent directors, which was long believed to be 
the panacea in corporate governance, notably in controlled companies, and gives rise 
to further research on blockholder governance, in particular to a systematic and thor-
ough analysis of companies with a controlling shareholder. Since the times are chang-
ing and the allocation of power between management and shareholders is currently 
being readjusted, at least and in particular in listed companies, we also have to rethink 
the corporate governance and public policy particularities relating to board composition 
and ownership structure of publicly-traded companies.
The complete article (including tables and footnotes), which has been discussed in this 

























Credit Suisse Establishes Covered Bond Programme
Reference: CapLaw-2019-31
Credit Suisse (Schweiz) AG established its CHF 20 billion Covered Bond Programme 
irrevocably guaranteed as to payments of interest and principal by Credit Suisse (Sch-
weiz) Hypotheken AG and on 16 July 2019 completed its inaugural issuance of CHF 
250 million 0.000% Fixed Rate Covered Bonds due 2029 thereunder. The Covered 
Bonds are indirectly backed by a portfolio of domestic mortgages originated by Credit 
Suisse Schweiz.
Cembra Money Bank Financing of its Acquisition  
of cashgate
Reference: CapLaw-2019-32
To finance the purchase price for its acquisition of cashgate and the refinancing of 
cashgate’s loan portfolio, Cembra Money Bank has sold treasury shares for gross pro-
ceeds of CHF 112.8 million in an accelerated bookbuilding and issued CHF 150 mil-
lion Perpetual Additional Tier 1 Bonds as well CHF 250 million Net Share Settled Con-
vertible Bonds.
Julius Baer Issues Perpetual Tier 1 Subordinated Bonds 
Reference: CapLaw-2019-33
On 25 June 2019, Julius Baer Group Ltd. issued CHF 350 million Perpetual Tier 1 

























Credit Suisse Issues Bail-inable Notes under  
EMTN Programme
Reference: CapLaw-2019-34
On 24 June 2019, Credit Suisse Group AG completed the issuance of EUR 1 bn 
1.000% Fixed Rate Reset Senior Callable Notes due 2027 under its Euro Medium 
Term Note (EMTN) Programme. The Notes are governed by Swiss law, eligible to 
count towards Credit Suisse’s Swiss gone concern requirement and exempted from 
the Swiss withholding tax regime. The Notes have been admitted to trading on the SIX 
Swiss Exchange. 
Credit Suisse Issues SGD 750 million 5.625 per cent. 
Perpetual Tier 1 Contingent Write-down Capital Notes
Reference: CapLaw-2019-35
On 6 June 2019, Credit Suisse Group AG issued SGD 750 million 5.625 per cent. 
Perpetual Tier 1 Contingent Write-down Capital Notes. The Notes are “high trigger” 
additional tier 1 capital instruments that are eligible to fulfill Credit Suisse’s Swiss go-
ing concern requirements. They feature a full contractual write-down if (among other 
events) Credit Suisse’s consolidated common equity tier 1 capital falls below 7 per 
















Quo Vadis – Financial Centre Switzerland?  
New Developments in Client and Investor Protection  
in Financial Markets Regulation 
(Quo Vadis – Finanzplatz Schweiz? Neuerungen beim 
Kunden- und Anlegerschutz im Finanzmarktrecht)
Wednesday, 28 August 2019, Universität Zürich-Zentrum, Zurich
http://www.eiz.uzh.ch/uploads/tx_seminars/Programm_Quo_Vadis_28.08.2019.pdf
22nd Conference Mergers & Acquisitions 
(22. Zürcher Konferenz Mergers & Acquisitions)
Tuesday, 3 September 2019, Lake Side, Zurich
http://www.eiz.uzh.ch/uploads/tx_seminars/Programm_M_A_03.09.2019__01.pdf
Capital Markets and Transactions XV 
(Kapitalmarkt – Recht und Transaktionen XV)
Tuesday, 19 November 2019, Metropol, Zurich
http://www.eiz.uzh.ch/uploads/tx_seminars/Programm_Kapitalmarkt_19.11.2019.pdf
In light of the new data protection laws, CapLaw has released a privacy statement. The privacy statement, 
as updated from time to time, is available on our website (see http://www.caplaw.ch/privacy-statement/). 
For any questions you may have in connection with our data processing, please feel free to contact us at 
privacy@caplaw.ch.
